This paper proves that the additive representation of Dekel-LipmanRustichini (2001) is consistent with any preference relation among the deterministic alternatives in their model. The result yields an additive representation which relaxes both the monotonicity and ordinal submodularity axioms in Kreps (1979) flexibility representation theorem.
Introduction
The pioneering work of Kreps [13] introduced preferences over menus and obtained an additive representation theorem that rationalizes preference for flexibility as subjective uncertainty over future tastes. His contribution motivated the papers by Gul and Pesendorfer [7] (GP) and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini [1] (DLR), which subsequently triggered a prolific literature on dynamic choice 1 .
While Kreps studies a finite choice setting in which a decision maker (DM) first chooses a menu with deterministic alternatives and then selects one of the alternatives contained in that menu, DLR (and GP) obtain their representation by introducing lotteries (i.e. probability distributions over the alternatives) and considering preferences over menus of those lotteries.
However, as observed by Olszewski [21] , most of the examples (if not all) in this literature refer to finite choice situations in which lotteries seem to play no essential role. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether the DLR axioms imply any constraints on finite choice behavior and, if so, what are exactly these constraints. This paper provides a negative answer by showing that every preference over menus of finitely many alternatives is consistent with the DLR representation. In Kreps' original setting, the result implies a generalization of his flexibility representation theorem which relaxes both the monotonicity and the ordinal sub-modularity axioms.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the main result, Section 3 relates it to the existing literature and Section 4 offers a conclusion. To simplify the exposition, all proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Model and main result
Let be a non-empty finite set, define to be the set of all non-empty subsets of and let be a generic binary relation on (with and standing for its asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively). Kreps (13) uses this simple setting to represent a DM that faces a two-stage decision process. In the first stage, she chooses a menu . In the second stage, she chooses an alternative from the previously chosen menu.
The alternatives in Kreps' model are deterministic 2 . DLR (1), in turn, use a richer setting in which the DM chooses menus of lotteries. Formally, let ( ) be the set of probability measures on (lotteries) endowed with the Euclidean topology. Let be the set of closed (hence compact) subsets of ( ) and let be a generic binary relation on (with and standing for its asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively).
For any deterministic alternative , denote by ( ) the degenerate lottery that assigns probability 1 to . For any menu of deterministic alternatives , define the lottery menu ( ) * | + . The binary relation over is said to be an extension of the binary relation over if implies ( ) ( ) and implies ( ) ( ).
The binary relation (resp. ) is said to be represented by (resp. 
represents . Every DLR preference over induces a preference over by associating each deterministic alternative with the corresponding degenerate lottery. That the converse is also true is the main result of this paper:
Theorem 1. Every preference on can be extended to a DLR preference on .
Whenever is an extension of a preference on , both and imply the same choice behavior among menus of deterministic alternatives (for it follows that if and only if for all ).
Note that Theorem 1 makes no claim of uniqueness. This is to be expected since, as observed by DLR [1] among others, it is not possible to identify the states in Kreps' representation result. In the context of Theorem 1, this lack of identification entails the generic existence of multiple DLR extensions of the same deterministic preference. It should be stressed that, while lack of uniqueness might decrease the appeal of using the finite setting for modeling behavior, the purpose of this paper is not to argue that we should do so, but rather to show the (lack of) finite choice implications of assuming the DLR axioms in the lottery setting. 
Relation to the literature
DLR later refined their representation result to make the state space finite (see [2] , Theorem 6), effectively characterizing the class of DLR preferences as defined in the previous section 3 . DLR preferences were further studied in the lottery setting by Kopylov [9] , who obtained conditions determining the number of positive and negative components.
The results presented in this paper also shed some light on the individual role of substantive axioms in the literature. For instance, preferences satisfying SM but not OSM have been studied by Ergin [5] and Natenzon [15] in the finite setting. Theorem 1 shows that every such a preference has an extension to the lottery setting. However, this extension cannot satisfy SM for OSM would follow 4 . It follows that Kreps' OSM assumption characterizes those preferences which can be extended to the lottery setting preserving the desire for flexibility.
Moreover, the representation in Corollary 1 also relates to GP's temptation and self-control representation in [7] . Specifically, GP obtain a representation on of the form:
where the functions and have expected utility form, is interpreted as a normative utility ranking and the inner maximized term as the cost of selfcontrol. It is easy to verify that this is a particular case of DLR's representation with one positive state and possibly one negative state. GP (8) later explored finite analogues, but the representations they obtained are nonadditive and rely on axioms which are less transparent than those employed by the same authors in the lottery setting.
Finally, in a recent contribution, Stovall [25] provided axioms relaxing those of GP [7] such that a preference on can be represented by:
The interpretation proposed by Stovall is that of uncertain temptations.
Similarly to the case of DLR, one may wonder how this representation constraints finite choices. A partial answer is given by the following: 
Concluding remarks
The literature on preferences over menus typically models DMs who care about lotteries even though, most often than not, only their deterministic As a final comment, I want to stress that the main point of this analysis is to shed light on how exactly DLR and related models constrain finite choice behavior, not to argue that they are too weak to be useful or that the lottery setting should be abandoned. Theorem 1 constitutes a formal verification that DLR do not surreptitiously forbid choice behavior that would be allowed if lotteries were not available to empower their axioms. In this sense, it allows one to conclude that the linear lottery structure used by DLR to identify the state space does not sacrifice generality regarding finite deterministic choices.
Appendix: Proofs
The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 1 below: Define the finite set , a "uniform" probability measure 
